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Abstract
This paper studies how a separation of ownership and management
affects a firm’s incentives to transfer knowledge about technology to
a rival in a Cournot duopoly. We consider a three-stage strategic
delegation game, where there are two technologies available; one with
increasing returns to scale and the other with constant returns to scale.
Whilst the former is known to both firms, only the more advanced
firm has initially access to the latter type of technology. This firm is
assumed to be managerial, not only with respect to product market
decisions, but also regarding the choice of whether or not to transfer
technology to the rival firm. We show that strategic management will
not necessarily affect the decision to transfer technology to a rival, but
we identify conditions under which it changes the technology choice
of the managerial firm. Welfare implications of this are considered.
Keywords: Technology transfer, managerial incentives, technology
adoption.
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1 Introduction
Diffusion of technology can be regarded as a prerequisite for exploiting the
full economic benefits of new discoveries. Baumol (2002), among others,
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regards innovation to be one of the main factors behind economic growth,
stating that new technology is spread rapidly across economies, as it often
pays innovators to share their knowledge, rather than to hoard it to them-
selves. One can dichotomize the literature on technology transfer accord-
ing to whether or not access requires a payment. Transfer may be secured
through licensing agreement of various kinds, or it may be accomplished free
of charge to the recipient.1 The latter is often puzzling for economists since
voluntary transfer can be regarded as diminishing a comparative advantage.
Harhoff et al. (2003) discuss the incentives for free-revelation, including the
insignificance of licensing income, costs associated with protecting innova-
tions, and the short timespan from invention to imitation. Inventions can
also be made more robust by disseminating them to users before commercial-
ization (Mishina, 1989), or peer recognition may be an important factor in
the revelation decision (see for example Lockemann, 2004). Theoretical mo-
tives and the empirical relevance of the voluntary revelation of technological
information is surveyed by Lhuillery (2006).
One recent novel approach to technology transfer is that of Bacchiega and
Garella (2008) - henceforth BG - who study a firm’s incentives to transfer
knowledge about competing production technologies to a less knowledgeable
rival in a Cournot duopoly. These technologies yield qualitatively different
cost functions and change the incentives of the recipient firm in the product
market. In this setting, the transfer of technology to a rival can actually
yield a competitive advantage for the transferring firm. In this paper we
extend the BG analysis to include managerial incentives on the part of the
most technologically advanced firm. As an illustration, Eden et al (1997)
maintain that multinational enterprises are the world’s technology producers,
and here any transfer decisions will be delegated away from the owners. We
are interested in how the separation of ownership and control changes the
incentives for technology transfer and its subsequent adoption. Importantly,
it is not just the production decision that is delegated to the manager, but
also the decision about whether or not technology should be transferred.
This is different to the approach of Mukherjee (2001) who looks at a model
of technology licensing with managerial delegation, but the only decision
made by the manager is about production; the licensing decision is made by
the owner before a manager is hired. Hence we consider the management
of technology transfer as well as production decisions. In giving incentives
to the manager, we employ a common objective function that is a weighted
1For an analysis of the effects of licensing agreements on technology transfer in Cournot
duopoly see Wang and Yang (2004).
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average of firm profits and income.2
In extending the BG model, we retain the feature that there is initially
no superior technology since one of these yields a cost function involving
only fixed costs while the other has only variable costs. This is in contrast
to much of the licensing literature which looks at incremental improvements
to an existing technology through the transfer of new knowledge.3 We show
that the incentives given by the owner of the most informed firm do not
affect the frequency of technology transfer, but that it can have an effect
on which technologies are employed by the transferring firm in equilibrium.
We identify conditions under which the firm owner benefits from delegation.
From a welfare point of view, we identify the technology choices that would
be dictated by a social planner and compare this to the market equilibrium.
Furthermore, we consider the setting of the incentive parameter by a social
planner who aims at maximizing social welfare and not just profits. We
identify conditions under which the firm owner actually takes socially optimal
decisions.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we develop a model of
strategic delegation with possible technology transfer to a rival in a Cournot
duopoly. In Section 3 analysis of the equilibrium is presented. In Section 4
we look at welfare aspects of technology transfer, and in Section 5 we offer
some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider an industry with two firms, labeled 1 and 2, producing a homoge-
neous good. Inverse market demand is linear and it is equal to
p = 1−Q (1)
whereQ = q1+q2 and p denotes the market price. The cost function naturally
depends on the technology adopted, where technology V is characterized by
a constant positive unit cost c > 0, while technology K is characterized by
only a fixed cost F > 0. Firm 1 can adopt one of two available technologies
V or K. The cost function for firm 1, depending on the technology choice,
2This was introduced by Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), and utilised
in the work of Mukherjee (2001). Recently, Jansen et al. (2007) have examined a market
share version of delegation games, finding that this gives qualitatively similar results to
basing incentives on profits and income/sales.
3Such as Wang and Yang (2004) and Mukherjee (2001).
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will then be given by one of the following
cV1 = cq1
cK1 = F
Initially, firm 2 only possesses technique K,4 and has cost
cK2 = F
We consider a three-stage model of competition between two firms, de-
picted in Figure 1. At stage 1 the owner of firm 1 designs an incentive scheme
for a manager, and this depends upon a weighted sum of firm 1’s profit and
revenue. Hence, we regard firms’ profit and liquidity as important aims as
in the seminal work by Fershtman and Judd (1987). The maximand for the
manager is then
M1 = απ1(q1, q2) + (1− α)R1(q1, q2) (2)
= R1(q1, q2)− αC(q1)
where π1 and R1 are firm 1’s profit and revenue, C(q1) is the relevant cost
function and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. If α < 1 firm 1’s manager moves away from strict
profit maximization. In this model we assume that firm 2 is entrepreneurial
(a firm which is owner-managed). Hence the owner of firm 2 maximizes its
profit.
At the second stage, the manager of firm 1 decides whether to transfer
the knowledge of the second technique to firm 2; firm 2 observes this choice
and conditional on the decision of firm 1, the firms make their technology
choices. At stage 2, the manager of firm 1 has four possible actions:
V H : firm 1 adopts technology V and does not transfer V to firm 2
KH : firm 1 adopts technology K and does not transfer V to firm 2
V T : firm 1 adopts technology V and transfers technology V to firm 2
KT : firm 1 adopts technology K and transfers technology V to firm 2
If the manager of firm 1 does not transfer technology V , firm 2 must
adopt the only technology at its disposition at stage 2 (technology K). If
technology V is transferred, then the owner of firm 2must also decide which of
the available technologies to adopt. Finally, in the third stage, the manager of
4In the case where the variable cost technique is common, the free transfer of knowledge
does not occur.
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Figure 1: The Game Tree
firm 1 and the owner of firm 2 simultaneously choose quantities in a Cournot
game, taking the technology choices and α as given.
At stage 3, the manger of firm 1 chooses output q1 to maximize M1;
depending on the technology combination chosen at stage 2, there are po-
tentially four different versions of (2), and these are denoted by M j1 , j =
{V K,KK,V V,KV } where the first element in each technology pair denotes
the technology choice of manager of firm 1 and the second is the choice made
by firm 2.
3 Equilibrium analysis
The game is solved by backwards induction. At stage 3 production decisions
are made simultaneously by the manager of firm 1 and the owner of firm 2.
For the manager of firm 1 the Cournot reaction functions with technology V
5
and technology K are:
qV1 =
1− qj2 − αc
2




, j = KK,KV (4)
If the manager uses technology V , a decrease in α means that the variable
cost receives less weight, causing more aggressive behavior by this firm in the
product market. With technology K, α has no direct effect on the level of
output chosen by the manager.
For the four potentially different combinations of technology that may
be used at this stage, the equilibrium payoffs in the product market to the
manager of firm 1 (M1) and the owners of each firm (π1 and π2) are given in
Table 1































The incentives of firm 1 to disclose knowledge about a production technol-
ogy to firm 2 depends on the level of F and c. To ensure positive quantities
and profits in all cases, we assume that F < 1
9
and c < 1
2
.5 Define the deci-
sion regarding technology as {x; (y, z)} where x = {KT,KH, V T, V H} is the
decision of the manager of firm 1. (y, z) is the technology adoption strategy
of firm 2 given that V is transferred by manager 1; y is the technology choice
by 2 if manager 1 adopts V (i.e. plays V T at stage 2) and z represents the
decision if manager 1 uses technology K (following 1’s choice of KT ). The
following lemma presents the equilibrium in the subgame starting at stage




Lemma 1 Fix a value of α from stage 1.
i) Let 0 < F < 4c(1−c)
9
≡ F I then the subgame starting at stage 2 has two
subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE):
{KT ; (K,K)} and {KH; (K,K)}
5The strictest conditions here are qVK1 (α = 1) = q
V V









9 − F > 0.
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leading to the technology pair KK.
ii) Let F I < F < 4c(1−c+αc)
9
≡ F II (α) then the subgame starting at stage
2 has a unique SPNE:
{KT ; (K,V )}
leading to the technology pair KV.
iii) Let F II (α) < F < 1
9
then the subgame starting at stage 2 has a
unique SPNE
{V T ; (V, V )}
leading to the technology pair V V.
Equilibrium payoffs to all players from each of these cases in equilibrium
are as given in Table 1 for the relevant technology pair.
Proof. See the Appendix
This lemma implies that when the fixed cost is small, firms will adopt
technology K and the manager of firm 1 is indifferent between transferring
technology V or not. When the fixed cost increases, firm 1 wants to transfer
the second technology to the rival. In equilibrium, when F I < F < F II (α) ,
manager 1 chooses the fixed cost technology (K) and firm 2 adopts the
variable cost technology (V ), and thereby firm 1 achieves higher profits and
quantity than firm 2. In the last case, as F increases more, both firms
rationally adopt technology V .
Notice that the three cases in Lemma 1 give rise to different combinations
of technology, and that the three cases can be distinguished according to the
value of F . When this fixed cost is very small, both firms adopt the fixed
cost technology and no choice of α affects the results; when F is very large
(above F II(α = 1)) then case ( iii) prevails independent of the choice of α.
When F I = F II (α = 0) < F < F II (α = 1), the owner of firm 1 has the
possibility of influencing which of case ( ii) or ( iii) is the continuation of the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Hence the optimal choice of α will reflect
the choice of the equilibrium that the owner of firm 1 wishes to implement; to
the extent that the equilibrium profit then depends upon α, the manager can
set this parameter to give the largest payoff possible from this equilibrium.
Suppose that the owner of firm 1 sets α so that we are in case (iii) in Lemma
1 achieving a payoff of πV V1 , which is strictly concave in α. The value of α






but this is only a valid choice as long as 1
9
> F > F II(α∗) = (3+c)c
9
and 1 > α∗ > 0, conditions that in combination imply a range for c of
−2
√
70 + 17 ≈ 0.266 8 > c > 1
5
.
Which technology the manager of firm 1 wants to adopt in the second
stage depends on α, since F II is a function of α. At stage 1 the owner of firm
1 can choose 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.When α = 0 the owner of firm 1 directs his manager
away from profit maximization to only including revenue incentives. For
F > F I this gives the technology choice of V V because F II(α = 0) ≡ F I , and
from Lemma 1 we have thatMV V1 > M
KV
1 when F > F
II . If α = 1 the owner
gives no other incentives to the manager than pure profit maximization,
and the manager of firm 1 chooses technology K when F < F II(α), the
same technology adoption as Bacchiega and Garella (2008). In the region
where F < F I = F II (α = 0) and F > F II (α = 1), α has no effect on the
technology adopted and the incentive to transfer knowledge to firm 2. Hence,
it is only when F I = F II (α = 0) < F < F II (α = 1) that the owner of firm
1 can affect the technology choice of his manager. The choice made involves
comparison of πV V1 and π
KV
1 for different values of α, c and F . The results
of these comparisons are summed up in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 I) For F I = F II (α = 0) > F > 0, no choice of α affects the
equilibrium. Profits are πKK1 and π
KK
2 .
II) For F I < F < c(34−c)−1
72
≡ F IV and 1
2
> c > 1
5
, and F I < F < c(1+c)
3
≡
F III and 1
7
< c < 1
5
, the optimal choice of α is
α ∈
µ




and the owner of firm 1 gets πKV1 and firm 2 gets π
KV
2 .
III a) For 1
9
> F > F IV and −2
√
70 + 17 ≈ 0.266 8 > c > 1
5
the optimal




and the owner of firm 1 gets πV V1 (α
∗) and firm 2 gets πV V2 (α
∗).
III b) For 1
9
> F > F III and 1
7




> F > F I and 0 < c < 1
7
the optimal choice of α is
α = 0
and the owner of firm 1 gets πV V1 (α = 0) and firm 2 gets π
V V
2 (α = 0).
Proof. See the Appendix
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Figure 2: Optimal α
Figure 2 summarizes Proposition 1. The area I below the F I-curve corre-
sponds to part I of Proposition 1; here we see that the fixed cost technology
is relatively inexpensive in relation to the alternative and that this leads both
firms to adopt technology K even if another technology is available. There
is no scope for changing this by strategic management of the type considered
here.
In area II (part II of Proposition 1), the optimal choice of technology pair
is KV . The owner of firm 1 finds it optimal to induce his manager to choose
the fixed cost technology and transfer the knowledge about the variable cost
technology to firm 2. To manage that, the owner of firm 1 has to choose







. From Lemma 1, when the fixed cost increases, the best
response of firm 2 is to adopt the transferred technology.
In the last case, in areas III a and b, the technology pairs represented to
the left of the F III- and F IV -curves have such a large fixed cost that both
firms want to adopt technology V . In this case we have that πV V1 (α
∗) > πKV1
for c > 1
5
(part III a of the proposition) and πV V1 (α = 0) > π
KV
1 for c <
1
5
(part III b of the proposition). The optimal incentive scheme is to place
less weight on the costs (part III a), which makes the manager of firm 1
9
Figure 3: Comparison of the model with strategic management to the BG
model
more aggressive in the output market. When the marginal cost associated
with technology V becomes very small for the firms, they will both behave
aggressively in the output market. Then the most profitable for the owner
of firm 1 is to direct his manager away from profit maximization to only
including sales incentives (part III b). In maximizing its profit, firm 2 also
chooses to adopt the constant returns to scale technology.
Figure 3 compares our results to those of Bacchiega and Garella (2008)
(i.e. α = 1). In the area to the left of the F II (α = 1)-curve there is no scope
for changing the technology choice by strategic management. The dark area
in Figure 3 shows where strategic management can affect the firms’ behavior
in equilibrium. In the model of BG, equilibria that involve the transfer of
technology V to its rival are also such that firm 1 adopts K itself and acts
aggressively in the product market. With strategic management of the type
considered here, the owner of firm 1 can place less weight on marginal costs
when technology V is adopted by his manager. Thus, the owner of firm 1 in
effect no longer has to make a dichotomous choice between technology with
constant or increasing returns to scale, but can use the incentive scheme to
mimic a constant returns to scale technology with a lower marginal cost.
10
This can make the choice of V optimal for the manager of firm 1, in contrast
to the BG model.
4 Welfare aspects
We consider the welfare implications of strategic management by comparing
the technology choices made by the managerial firm and the entrepreneurial
counterpart with the technology choices made by a social planner. We also
study the case where the planner only can affect the optimal level of α from
a social welfare perspective compared to the private market solution of the
previous section. The social welfare function W (Q) is defined as the sum of
consumer surplus CS(Q) and profits
W (Q) = CS(Q) + π1 + π2
where CS(Q) = Q
2
2
. If the manager of firm 1 is given an incentive scheme
that makes him act as if the marginal production cost is αc, and both firms
use technology V , then social welfare can be written as















In the absence of an incentive scheme social welfare in this case is recov-
ered by setting α = 1 in (6).6 If the technology combination is KV , then
social welfare is independent of α, and is given by
WKV =W VK =
c
18
(11c− 8) + 4
9
− F (7)
With technology choices KK, the social-welfare function is again inde-





4.1 Planner dictates technology
To start with, we assume that a planner can dictate the technology choice
of both firms, and the firms take their own decisions in the product market.
The choice of technology adoption made by the planner involves comparison
of (6) with α = 1, (7) and (8).

















Figure 4: Technology choices dictated by the planner
Figure 4 demonstrates the technology choice in equilibrium from a welfare
point of view. When the fixed cost is small compared to the variable cost,
when F < c(8−11c)
18
≡ F IW 7 (area I in figure 4), the optimal technology pair
is KK. Increasing fixed costs, for F IW < F <
c(8+3c)
18
≡ F IIW (area II in the
figure), leads to WKV =W VK > WKK and the technology pair KV or VK.
For F > F IIW (area III in the figure), where W
KV = W VK < W V V , the
planner chooses technology pair V V .
The comparison of the equilibrium in the private market versus the so-
cially first-best equilibrium is characterized by the following proposition. The
subscript P is from the private market solution from section 3, andW is from
a welfare point of view.
Proposition 2 I) For F IW < F < F
I
P the private solution gives technology
pair KK, while the planner would prefer the adoption of the fixed cost tech-
nology (K) by one firm and the variable cost technology (V ) by the other
firm. Hence, W V K = WKV > WKK and, for a given combination of F and
7From the inequality WKK > WKV =WVK
12
c in this area, the loss in welfare is − c
18
(11c− 8c)− F.8




70 + 17 > c > 1
5





< c < 1
5
, and F IP < F < F
II
W and 0 < c <
1
7
the planner chooses the
technology pair KV or VK, while the private solution is V V . For a given





This proposition implies that the welfare optimal choice of technology
pair is more often VK or KV than in the private market, where the actors
preferKK for low fixed cost and V V when the fixed cost increases compared
to the variable cost. In their choice of technologies, the firms’ decisions
represent only their private incentives. Specifically, neither takes account of
the effect that own decisions have on the rival, and neither firm thinks about
how their actions affect the consumers. The planner of course takes all of
this into account. Interestingly, when the firms would have chosen KK as
the technology pair, the planner prefers diverging technologies even though
this leads to a lower level of consumer surplus. The planner thus opts to
eradicate the duplication of fixed costs in the industry at the expense of the
consumers. This type of "regulation" would appear to be at odds with the
widely accepted view in competition law that consumers’ interests should
receive most weight.
Figure 5 demonstrates the result of the comparison, where area A indi-
cates the combinations of F and c relating to part I) of Proposition 2, and
area B corresponds to part II).
4.2 The planner’s choice of the incentive scheme
Let us now assume that the planner does not have the power to dictate the
technology choices of both firms, but that he can set α; one can imagine
for example that firm 1 is partly owned by society. We can then consider
the welfare implications of strategic management by comparing the optimal
level of α from a social welfare perspective and the private market solution of
section 3. From the expression (6) it is clear that W V V is a strictly concave
function of α and that it attains its maximum for α < 0 for permissible values
of c. Hence W V V is maximized for α = 0, giving a welfare level of
W V V (αW = 0) =
1
18
(4− 5c) (2− c) (9)







, where WKK = 49 − 2F and
WVK =WKV = c18 (11c− 8) +
4
9 − F .









, where WV V = 4(c−1)
2
9 and
WVK =WKV = c18 (11c− 8) +
4

















Figure 5: Comparison of equilibrium in the private market versus the socially
first-best equilibrium




P (α = 0), a planner can choose which
of the equilibria V V or KV he would prefer to be implemented. Comparison




F IIIW . Hence, for F in this region, the planner will set α = 0 for F > F
III
W
with ensuing equilibrium characterized by technology transfer and use by
both firms; when F < F IIIW , on the other hand, the equilibrium involving
technology choices KV will be preferred, and α will be set to achieve this.








F < F IP there is no choice of α that will affect the decisions of the firms so
it can be set arbitrarily.
Comparing the planner’s equilibrium with the equilibrium in the private




70 + 17 > c > 1
5
the owner of firm 1 chooses α∗ = 5c−1
4c
resulting in V V , while the planner







which gives KV . For a given pair F, c in
this region the loss in welfare compared to the private solution is
10The expression on the right-hand-side of the inequality is such that F II(α) = F .
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> c > 1
5
the planner wants to set
α = 0 (giving V V ) but the private solution is α∗ and the loss in welfare is
















This is summed up in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 I) For F IVP < F < F
III
W the optimal incentive scheme for a
planner is α ∈ (9F−4c+4c2
c
, 1], while the owner of firm 1 chooses α∗.
II) For F > F IIIW and c >
1
5
the planner chooses α = 0, and the owner of
firm 1 chooses α∗.
III) For F > F IIIW and c <
1
5
then the social optimum is obtain by the
market; α = 0.
Figure 6 diagrammatically summarizes Proposition 3. In area I, corre-
sponding to part I in Proposition 3, the owner of firm 1 and the planner
choose different incentive schemes to maximize profits and welfare, which in-
volves different optimal choices of technology: V V in the private equilibrium
and KV = VK in the welfare equilibrium. In area II (part II of Proposition
3) the owner of the managerial firm strategically places weight on both profits
and revenue in the incentive scheme, while the planner prefers the manager
to maximize revenue only. The optimal technology pair is V V for both cases.
In area III (part III of Proposition 3), the social optimum is obtained by the
market, where the incentive scheme for the manager of firm 1 only includes
an incentive to maximize revenue.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the managerial incentives of a firm to freely
transfer knowledge about a production technology to its rival. We have found
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Figure 6: Comparison of the optimal incentive scheme for the owner of firm
1 versus the social planner
the incentives to transfer knowledge about a new technology to a rival. We
identify conditions, however, under which it affects the technology choice of
the managerial firm, and hence the intensity of competition in the product
market. The owner of the managerial firm can affect the technology choice
of its manager through the settings of the incentive scheme. In effect, the
adoption of an incentive scheme that weights profits and income gives the
owner of the managerial firm the possibility of selecting the type of equilib-
rium that he finds most beneficial (in terms of giving the most profit). In the
optimal setting of the incentive scheme, the owner has to take account of the
effect that this will have on the technology adoption by the rival firm (if new
technology is transferred) and its own manager’s subsequent choice of tech-
nology. Each technology pair that is chosen by the actors leads to a different
outcome in the product market. In addition to influencing the technology
pair, the owner can credibly distort the incentives of its manager away from
pure profit maximization in order to make the opposing firm less aggressive
in the product market. Transferal of knowledge can make the rival firm more
efficient in equilibrium, and in some case the disclosing firm actually adopts
the less efficient technique. In this paper we have demonstrated that this ef-
fect can be mitigated when the technologically more advanced firm is run by
a manager with other incentives that pure profit maximization. By breaking
the dichotomy of the technology choice through the incentive scheme, the
managerial firm chooses also to adopt the transferred technology, compared
16
to the model without strategic management. If the owner fails to take into
effect the full effect of its incentive scheme in this environment, then the loss
of profit that this can entail may be substantial.
Furthermore, we compare the welfare equilibrium to the optimal market
solution. We analyze two different cases. In the first case the social plan-
ner can dictate the firms’ adoption of technology. This results in choosing
different technologies for the firms more often than the market equilibrium;
this occurs both for small and high values of the fixed and variable cost. In
the other case, where the social planner does not have the opportunity to
dictate the technology choices made by the firms, we assume that the more
advanced firm is a part publicly owned firm, and the planner may maximize
welfare by choosing an incentive scheme for the manager. When the variable
cost is small the socially optimal incentive scheme is to direct the manager
away from strict profit maximization to only include revenue; this is the exact
same solution that is obtained by the market.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
i) If 0 < F < F I = F II (α = 0) then the following inequalities hold:






2 =⇒ F < F II (α)






2 =⇒ F < F I = F II (α = 0)
Firm 2 chooses technology K at both decision nodes, hence the best the
manager of firm 1 can do is to choose strategy KT or KH. (The manager
of firm 1 is indifferent between KH and KT )
ii) If F I = F II (α = 0) < F < F II (α) then the following inequalities
hold:













2 =⇒ F > F I = F II (α = 0)
MKV1 > M
V K
1 =⇒ F <
c (2 + 4α) + c2 (1− 4α2)
9α
≡ F V
At node (i) in Figure 1, firm 2 chooses technology K, and technology V
is chosen at node (ii). Given these actions, manager 1 finds it optimal to
choose KT if F < F V and since F II < F V this inequality holds.
iii) If F II (α) < F < 1
9
then the following inequalities hold:













2 =⇒ F > F V I
18
Firm 2 chooses technology V for both decision nodes, and V T is also the
best response for the manager of firm 1 when F > 4c(1+c−αc)
9
≡ F V I and since
F II > F V I this holds.
Proof of Proposition 1
I) In the region 0 < F < F I then no choice of α has any effect on the
equilibrium
II) In the region F I < F < c(34−c)−1
72
≡ F IV and 1
2




∗) < πKV1 , and in the region F
I < F < c(1+c)
3
≡ F III and c < 1
5
we
have that πV V1 (α = 0) < π
KV
1 . From Lemma 1, to achieve π
KV
1 , we need
F < F II(α) = 4c(1−c+αc)
9
. This expression gives the optimal choice of α in
the interval
1 > α >
9F − 4c (1− c)
4c2
From F I < F < F III we have c > 1
7
.
III a) We define α so F > F II(α) and in this region Lemma 1 gives the








which gives the owner of firm 1 πV V1 (α
∗) = 1
8
(1− c)2.To ensure that α∗ is
the optimal choice we need πV V1 (α






≡ F IV (10)
From (10) and with the requirement that α∗ > 0, c will be in the region
−2
√
70 + 17 > c >
1
5
III b) In the region F > F II(α) and for 0 < c < 1
5
, the best response for
the owner of firm 1 is to choose
α = 0
since πV V1 attains its maximum for α < 0, hence π
V V
1 is maximized for
α = 0. We have then that πV V1 (α = 0) =
(1−2c)(1+c)
9
and α = 0 is optimal for












< c < 1
5
since F III > F I when c > 1
7
. For 0 < c < 1
7
we have that
πV V1 (α = 0) > π
KK
1 when
1
9
> F >
4c (1− c)
9
≡ F I
20
